Structure and Agency in Masculine/Feminine Performance: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of a Transgender Narrative

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Introduction

The Utility of Narratives for Symbolic Interactionism

Narratives are stories and accounts that are socially and culturally structured, and adopted by individuals within groups that hold shared characteristics and meanings surrounding social objects. These stories are also sometimes based on myths, insofar as individuals structure their future trajectories according to the *assumed* truth of a narrative life-story, such as the innateness of gender dichotomies. Maines (2001) asserts that narratives, or the *autoethnographies* of individuals, are structured by *constructions of knowledge*. Constructions of knowledge are the ways in which individuals structure their lives, activities, and future trajectories while attempting to understand themselves within their social, cultural and political positions. Narratives can be ascribed to individuals based upon *assumed* characteristics, such as gender linked to biological sex, and also adopted, such as those surrounding secondary characteristics—for example, an illness or the *emergence of novelty*.

Constructions of knowledge and their embeddedness within narrative accounts not only allows us a look into how individuals structure their lives according to *available* stories, but also how these stories can be utilized for the purpose of extending symbolic interactionist theory. Within narratives we can find how the stories *themselves are structured* and *adhered to* by individuals, and moreover, how macro forces and structures are reflected within micro-level negotiations between individuals and their narrative structures at the meso layer (Fine 1991). Archer (2004) contends that the location between macro structure and micro-level interaction acts as the level of *mediation*. Narratives, because they are couched within a macro structure of language and

form a link to micro, interpersonal interactions, are thus useful as a location of study for symbolic interactionism to understand constraint and available agency.

Narratives are subject to change, in continual fluctuation, and adaptive to changing structures, social contexts and the social positions of actors. Narratives, and therefore how individuals perceive themselves, are in a state of perpetual process; an *ongoing accomplishment* of adaptation to the emergence of novelty and self-reflexive processes. Moreover, individuals attempt to maintain congruence with the responses of others (generalized others) with the their own conception of *self* (identity).

Maines (2001) proposes that narratives, or *autoethnographies*, can be used to illustrate structural constraints. Thus, by drawing on the autoethnography of Wilchins (1997) *Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender*, this paper will undertake on Maines' (2001) suggestion, illustrating how narratives can be examined for Mead's conceptions of "I" and "Me", the link to the "generalized other", the emergence of novelty, and Mills' (1940) vocabularies of motive. This paper examines a narrative that is couched within gender— conceptualized as a highly rigid and enduring structure of behaviour and visual cues (Stone 1962)—to portray the *constraints* of gendered structures from within a *transgender* account. Making use of a symbolic interactionist perspective, in particular Maines' (2001) insights on narrative use, we will see that the *agency* Wilchins (1997) assumes she appropriates, is in fact *constrained* by regulated gender story lines, and by the *available* transgender narrative she gives to the reader.

Stories of Gender

Gender has been described as a set of regulated and prescribed *roles* (Maines 2001, Ridgeway; Smith-Lovin 1999, Stone 1962, West; Zimmerman 1987, Kennelly; Merz; Lorber 2001; Kroska 2001), social statuses or categories embedded within a hierarchy of *relations* (Burke; Tully 1977, Howard 2000, Gerson; Peiss 1985, Ferree; Hall 2000) and scripted *performances* (Chowdorow 1985, Butler 1993; 2004, Messner 2000, Riley; Burke 1995). Most contend that gender is not innate or natural, but socially constructed, learned through socialization processes, enforced through sanctioning of gender inappropriate behaviours (Ford; Stevenson; Wienir; Wait 2000, Ridgeway; Smith-Lovin 1999, Digby 1989), and reproduced through daily interactions (Hawkesworth 1997). Gender is based upon a sexual dichotomy of two, and only two sexes, embedded within differentiated performances, scripts and visual displays attributed to femininity and masculinity (Ridgeway; Smith-Lovin 1999, Ridgeway; Correll; 2000, Howard 2000, Stone 1962).

While some contend that gender performances lay along a continuum of *choices* (agency) available to the actor (Butler 1993; 2004), ambiguity, or 'genderlessness' is impossible to realize as individuals gauge and determine the gender of the other, regardless of self-perception and the 'choice' of performance taken (Ridgeway; Smith-Lovin 1999, Roen 2002). Because individuals cannot control how others perceive and act towards them, they are *fated* (Maines 2001) to reproduce gender divisions in all social interactions. As Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999) point out, individuals automatically sex categorize others, relying upon behaviours and visual cues

such as manner of dress to guide them. For the survival and reification of gender, interaction between supposedly 'different' sex-genders must occur (Ridgeway; Correll 2000, Ferree; Hall 2000; Maines 2001). Maines (2001), Ridgeway and Correll (2000) argue that most individuals comply with gendered norms, adapting to expectations without much thought or criticism to the social construction of gendered differences and the imposition of gender-specific performances and cues. Gender and the differences attributed to biological sexes are presupposed, culturally embedded, taken-for-granted, and structurally arranged through daily interactions between men and women. Individuals are thus automatically sex and gender categorized by others, made into cultural objects whose *meanings* (identities) are reproduced through dichotomous, differentiated performances. What individuals are left with is little room to transgress gendered boundaries, and therefore, the inability to acquire agency.

Mead's "I", "Me" and Theory of the Past

Mead's theory of the past entails temporality and space as intertwined with the pasts, present and future trajectories of individuals (Maines; Sugrue; Katovich 1983). Mead's (1962) conceptualization of the individual's "I" is the response to the "Me" of the *self* in social interaction, becoming a "past" after the event has lapsed from the present in memory. Linked to narrative accounts, the past and future build on both ends of individuals' life-stories and conception of 'who they are'. Individuals "order" their life-stories and plan future activities around the interpretive *and* learned *meanings* they attach to their pasts. The present is only grasped by the individual in relation to their social environment and their interpretations of it based on past events. Following in a continuous, and therefore 'logical', pattern, ordering of

pasts and planning of future responses lends toward predictability and a stable sense of self as an *identity*. Because individuals are also constrained by gendered expectations in interactions, this patterned arrangement of pasts is also linked to forming *stable* identity perceptions of the *gendered self*. Drawing on Mead, individuals are also *interested*, insofar as they will act only for their best interests, and will maintain, for the most part, context-appropriate gender behaviours and performances to reach personal goals (Maines; Sugrue; Katovich 1983).

Since gender is embedded within *socially expected* behaviours and displays, a *discontinuity* in gender performance may result in a social sanction of disapproval. Mead posits that behaviours that do not meet expectations of the "I", will engage in "symbolic restructuring" of pasts to maintain consistency between pasts, present, future trajectory and new perceptions of the *self* (Maines; Sugrue; Katovich 1983). Inconsistencies force *self-reflexive processes*, an adaptive response to stabilize, and therefore lend predictability to, future interactions and gendered behaviours. Moreover, restructuring of the *symbolic meanings* of pasts catalyzed by a discontinuity is used to abate future social sanctions.

Maines et al. (1983) assert that "personal continuities" exist in biographical work, portraying how individuals order their pasts to correlate to their present, and in such, form links between past and present events of importance. We can propose that the ways in which individuals restructure their pasts are based upon a pre-existing 'template' offered by *others*, worked into their narrative account. Therefore, when a discontinuity in gender identity (meaning) is realized, individuals will either adapt with change (restructuring), or continue on with the same trajectory

ignoring the inconsistency. In Mason-Schrock's (1996) study of transsexual support groups, Mead's theories are consistent with members "glossing over" or "tactfully ignoring" biographical inconsistencies of other members. Inconsistencies in behaviour are also attributed to the individual's "denial" of their transsexuality. Wilchins (1997) illustrates this self-reflexive realignment of her pasts to correlate with her identity, stating that:

> "Changing what I 'meant' required my learning to use a particular set of *internal signals to create myself*, to *re-read* my own body... The images we form of ourselves and see in our heads constitute a kind of internal dialogue. They are *conversations we hold about ourselves* about what our bodies *mean*, an imaginary *construction we undertake over and over again*. In time, these images stabilize and become what we identify as 'our selves'." (155: emphasis added).

Wilchins' (1997) statement posits that in order for her to form a stable identity meaning, she embarked on a process of self-reflection, judging her "I" when it shifted into the "Me" aspect of her gender-based experience. In this process she reflects on recent events for cohesiveness to her pasts and burgeoning conception of self (identity). Drawing on Erikson (1995), reflections between the "I" and "Me" are self-regulating processes in search of an "authentic self." However, because the search for the authentic self is through the formation of an "identity" (Erikson 1995), which is embedded within social processes and identification with a group, the narrative attached is structured to follow a storyline of *believability* for others (Maines 2001).

Members of trans groups look for events in their pasts that symbolize their ‘true transsexual self.’ Finding the true self often entails restructuring childhood and adolescent events into ‘repressed signifiers’ of ‘legitimate transsexuality’ such as unearthing past incidences of cross-dressing or the adoption of opposite gender mannerisms (Mason-Schrock 1996). Consistent with Mason-Schrock’s (1996) findings, Wilchins (1997) manages to locate her repressed pasts that are, ironically, in alignment with the narratives of other transgender individuals:

> “It’s beautiful.” I exclaim. It is, in fact, a particularly fine watch my father has just bought for my seventh birthday, the jewelled face throwing back at me the summer’s sunlight. “It’s...it’s,” I hesitate, searching for just the right word, “it’s *divine*.” I breathe happily. My father’s face comes up sharply, his pupils narrowing. “Boys don’t say divine.” And he watches me, his head cocked slightly to one side. I open my mouth to question this unfathomable statement, as if certain dictionary words are colored blue for boys and pink for girls... I make a small mental note to avoid this particular word in the future.” (41: emphasis in original)

The above statement illustrates Wilchins’ (1997) attempt, in accordance with the trans community narrative, to illustrate her ‘true’ transgendered self by searching her pasts for some recollection of her ‘real’ self. Wilchins (1997) uses processes of self-reflexivity to gauge the cohesiveness between the “I,” “Me” and her childhood pasts, manipulating past events and

memories into cohesive alignment with new gender identity perceptions. Moreover, this alignment further portrays the link of internal processes to generalized others.

The Generalized Other

Mead's theory of the past is public in nature; taking into account the generalized others that individuals may interact with when they formulate their future trajectories and reflect on their pasts (Maines et. al 1983). Gender performances and displays are inherently social; depending upon interaction with others for reproduction (Maines 2001). West and Zimmerman (1987) contend that gender must "done" to be successful. Doing gender is based on culturally shared meanings surrounding male and female bodies as social objects. Moreover, because gender is based upon *learned* behaviours and visual cues, its 'successful' performance is an *on-going accomplishment* that depends on the feedback (responses) of others (West; Zimmerman 1987).

Drawing from Erikson (1995), we can propose that gender is a processual enactment of socially constructed norms that are presumably part of the *authentic self*. Roen (2002) proposes that "doing" transgender means successfully "passing" as the opposite gender, effectively "hiding" the biological body under a different gender script to 'fool' the other. In order to "do" gender with success then, depends on *how others perceive* the actor undertaking the performance. With this in mind, trans individuals must remain ever vigilant to how they *might* be perceived. Constrained by how others perceive the trans performance as authentic or inauthentic in the performance of the opposite sex employs Mead's (Maines et al. 1983) concept of the generalized other. In short, Mead's conceptualization of the generalized other, in respect to performing the

script of the opposite gender, requires transgendered individuals to be attentive to the *genderized other*. Wilchins (1997) engages in self-reflexive processes attentive to others around her in the statement:

> "I was obsessed with how I looked and was *perceived*. I became a ferocious shopper, lusting after any clothing that would *hide* my height and shoulders. I bought winter gloves and dress shoes a size too small. My pinched hands and feet went along with the *higher voice I practiced* when speaking on the phone." (34: emphasis added)

Further, Mason-Schrock (1996) points out that to be a successful *transgender*, individuals must *act* according to the narrative of the group. This requires the *relearning from others* in how to "be" transgender, and thus, how to 'view' the self. Individuals that claim a transgender identity look to transgendered others in how to successfully engage in 'trans performances'. The trans community in turn provides the necessary "tools" (read identity script) for success (believability and consensus). Tools of the trans community involve "narratives of authenticity", as well as "modeling", "rhetorical language" and "ritualization" of narratives told in a support group atmosphere (Mason-Schrock 1996). Most salient is that transgender individuals, who assume they are free agents, look to others to inform them of whether or not their performances, and the narratives told, are indeed believable. Wilchins' (1997) autobiography depicts this requirement for consensus in the meanings attached to 'doing' her transgender identity, recalling that:

> "... as she anxiously scanned my face for a reaction, she said, 'I have to depend on other people to tell me how I look because I don't *know how to see myself yet*... She must know how others see her so she can know how to see herself; otherwise, she enters society at her peril... Since her status and legitimacy as a woman will always be at risk, always be *determined by others*, she may find that her lack of contact with sensation grows along with a nagging sense of bodily disorientation.'" (35-6: emphasis added).

Mason-Schrock (1996) and Roen (2002) also found consistent amongst transgender and transexual individuals that part of the process of transitioning is a shift from a transgender identity to transsexual, and eventually into identifying as either "woman" or "man." Members of the group share a collective identity process in which new members learn how to be "authentically" trans through a progressive, linear procedure with regimented stages of transition (Roen 2002). Because part of the *on-going accomplishment* of transitioning is to 'become' the sex of the other, Wilchins (1997) is constrained by the *process narrative* of the trans community, recalling that:

> "Determined to be a 'successful' transexual, I worked earnestly at being straight, at developing a proper attraction to men. I examined their firm little butts, learning to decipher which were cute and not." (177).

Wilchins' (1997) statement depicts how in her efforts to remain in alignment with the process narrative of the trans community, she *learned* how to be a heterosexual woman by learning how to *read* the bodies of the opposite sex. Wilchins essentially relearns gender *as* the genderized other. By effectively learning how to "do" heterosexuality, she could further progress to the next level of being an authentic transsexual and gain approval from her community. Moreover, learning how to "pass" by knowing how to decipher others, aids her in her ability to gauge the responses of generalized others in future social interactions.

Identity and the Emergence of Novelty

For transgender individuals, the emergence of novelty and the generalized other are intrinsically linked. It is through the emergence of a *new* way of seeing the self through an *emergent narrative* that individuals attempt to push gendered boundaries by *emulating* the *other*. Mead defines an emergence of novelty as an event that disrupts the future trajectory of the individual (Maines et al. 1983). Individuals, when presented with an innovation will either choose to remain in line with their predetermined trajectory, or adapt through change. We can assume that if change results, the narrative of an individual must change as well.

In respect to transgender individuals, novelty emerges through postmodern language and the idea that gender can be transgressed via "disrupted" performances (Roen 2002). Writers such as Butler, Foucault and Derrida are drawn upon with post-structuralist theories of sexual and gendered multiplicity and fluidity (Roen 2002). Wilchins (1997) autoethnography illustrates the emergence of postmodern novelty stating that:

> "In Judith Butler's terms, Sex is to Nature (raw) as Gender is to Culture (cooked). The naturalness of sex grounds and legitimizes the cultural practice of gender. But what if this narrative is inverted? Maybe the formula is reversed. Gender is not what culture creates out of my body's sex; rather, sex is what culture makes when it genders my body... Sex, the bodily feature mostly completely in-the-raw, turns out to be thoroughly cooked... We are left staring once again at the Perpetual Motion Machine of gender as it spins endlessly on and on, creating difference at every turn" (51)

Drawing from Roen (2002), we can propose that Wilchins (1997) adopts the *postmodern narrative* of a multiplicity of identities, sexualities and the presumed agency to disrupt gendered norms via adoption of the 'other' (also see Mason-Schrock). Wilchins (1997) explains that to 'transgress the boundaries' between biological sexes and culturally created gender displays, she *found* agency through another.

> "How did I know that I was a transexual? I remember being very confused and wanting to do dreadful things to my body and gender display, then reading Christine Jorgensen's book and thinking, *That's it, that's what I must be. I'm a transexual.* Borrowing from Marjorie Garber, my nose job was something I did, but my dick job was something I was. Having a dick job meant acquiring a whole

> new identity. Loving my girlfriend meant I was now a lesbian. I had become a transexual, and I was in someone else's body." (64: emphasis in original).

The "realization" of what Wilchins (1997) "is" is further met with admittance that she had 'stumbled upon' the concept of transsexuality, an emergent novelty that she "borrowed" and adapted her narrative to. However, we must question, how she could "admit" to being transsexual when she was previously unaware of it before finding Jorgensen's book, as this passage illustrates:

> "I hadn't even known the word *transexual*, nor that it was a word meant for me. In fact, I hadn't even known if transexuals really existed, until at age twenty-eight I read Christine Jorgensen's book and finally admitted to being one." (176: emphasis in original).

Mason-Schrock (1996) found that transsexuals would attempt to "make sense of themselves" through the stories of others. Drawing from Mead's conception of *consensus* (Maines 2001), a shared storyline by transsexuals in support groups renders feelings of 'gendered confusion' and incongruent sex-gender displays as *inauthentic*. Because the objective of the transgender narrative is for an individual to find their "true self" through a community-based and therefore *shared*, narrative (Mason-Schrock 1996), it is assumed that adoption of a new narrative will permit transgression from gendered boundaries and constraints (Roen 2002). However, even the emergence of innovation is highly structured into trans narratives as Mason-Schrock (1996) and

Roen (2002) have found, and Wilchins (1997) has illustrated. Moreover, the notion of gendered agency is *built into* the narrative itself. To exclaim personal agency in performance is a necessary component of acting out the transgender identity for group cohesion.

Sex and gender become *symbolic objects with a shared meaning* when in the *context* of the transgender group. The emergence of novelty, in this case the story of Jorgensen and the theories of Butler, Foucault and Derrida, provide Wilchins with not only a *ready-made narrative* in which to appropriate, but also a new means of objectifying her *self* both in context to the trans group, and in relation to gendered structures. Roen (2002) states that transsexuality adopts a *political position* in that individuals attempt to 'disrupt' gender normatives. Through the emergence of post-modernity and a post-structuralist deconstruction of sex-gender binaries, transsexual and transgender individuals adopt a *gender-political narrative*. Postmodern theory is couched within language, constraints of language, and the proposed availability of multiple identities, sexualities and genders through "disrupted" performances that alter the meanings of individuals as gendered objects (Butler 1993; 2004).

Wilchins also attempts to surpass the constraints of language, the very language that enabled this new identity narrative to materialize for her. Mead argues that with the emergence of novelty, an individual will act self-reflexively, "grasping" new information that alters how they previously conceived of their social realities (Maines et al. 1983). With the emergence of postmodern theories, this sets up Wilchins' narrative to recount such constraints as her own. Wilchins adopts

language constraints into her narrative, suiting a dual purpose, both as a source of novelty, and as a *vocabulary of motive* for adopting a new transgender narrative.

> "Everyday speech is conducted according to a largely implicit set of givens that everyone within a common speech community accepts. These givens act as rules, *enabling* us to *interpret* what statements mean, even what things can be said. Because these rules are common to all members of this *community*, more or less, they perform a powerful basis for each of us to *construct and experience the reality* of our bodies. This is why it is so difficult and frustrating to say anything useful about transgendered or intersexed (hermaphroditic) bodies. The rules of the discourse actually prevent intelligent communication." (66: emphasis added).

If the emergence of novelty can alter the future trajectories of individuals, we can propose that their narrative will also provide a justification, or motive, for doing so. In the last section, drawing on Mills (1940) theory of the vocabulary of motive, we will see how language in *motive narratives* is also constrained by that accepted within the group.

Vocabularies of Motive

As shown, narratives are structured and constrain the available stories that individuals can employ. In this final section, we will see that gender narratives, when the structural boundaries are pushed into transgender, will also portray *regulated* vocabularies of motive for doing so. Motives are used to justify and account for behaviours and activities when others call them into

question. A vocabulary of motive is also a form of narrative account that is structured and limited in available options open to deployment. As Maines (2001) points out, narratives must be believable to *others* and must therefore follow a pre-existing framework to be useful for individuals—and vocabularies of motive are no different. The vocabularies of motive given by individuals are tied to their group narrative for plausibility purposes, and because they are context and group specific, they are constrained and regulated by those group members. As Roen (2002) points out, belonging to a gender is no different than belonging to any other social group, and therefore, rules in vocabularies of motives must imbibe to trans-gender group standards.

Mead contends that language is situated in social context (Maines et al. 1986). Social context can denote a group or *social world* in which a motive can be deployed and believed as plausible. Mills (1940) contends that motives are constrained by language and link actions to social controls. Generalized others act as agents of control by limiting the acceptable excuses that can be offered by individuals. Wilchins (1997), by adopting a postmodern theory on the fluidity of gender, aligns her narrative to the trans community. As Mason-Schrock (1996) and Roen (2002) also found, transgender individuals will justify their transitioning as being born into the wrong body, or being trapped in the wrong culture. This particular vocabulary of motive is also depicted within Wilchins' (1997) autobiography, as she exclaims:

> "... we are trapped in the *wrong minds*. We have, too many of us for too long, been trapped in too much self-hate: the *hate reflected back at us by others* who, unwilling to look at the *complexity* of our lives, *dismiss our femaleness, our*

> *femininity*, and our sense of gender and erotic choices as merely imitative or simply derivative." (47: emphasis added)

Wilchins' (1997) statement portrays congruence to the motivation narrative found by Mason-Schrock (1996) and Roen (2002). She synthesizes the motives as both being born into the wrong mind, and being trapped in the wrong culture that refuses to acknowledge her sexual and gendered complexities.

Conclusion

Critique of Transgender: Structure and Agency

As shown, narratives portray not only macro structural constrains on the individual, but that narratives themselves are also highly structured and adopted for believability in community consensus. Wilchins' (1997) narrative is consistent with Maines (2001) in that narratives are both structured and show structure. What becomes apparent with the adoption of gendered performances of the 'other' is not agency, but reproduction of gendered normatives in behaviour and visual cues—a narrative *fated* to reification. If "doing" a successful transgender identity is to emulate the oppositional gender from that initially ascribed to an individual, this still reproduces and enforces gender dichotomies without 'disrupting' them as postmodern theories such as Butler (1993; 2004), and the account of Wilchins (1997) would have us believe.

It appears that the adoption of the postmodern narrative of multiple sexual and gendered identities is taken not to convince the generalized other that a 'fluid mosaic' in these variables does indeed exist, but merely provides a structured storyline of novelty for the interested individual to appropriate. Thus, Wilchins' (1997) autobiography does not document a 'disruption' of gender performances, but an *attempt to convince her self that it does,* while remaining congruent to the transgender community's narrative of believability. Dissent, and therefore agency, from the transgender narrative is not found, as shown by comparison to the trans group narrative work of Roen (2002) and Mason-Schrock (1996).

We may, however, propose that agency *is* found in the act of *performative interference,* whereby toying with the assumed correlation between biological sexes and gender performances is 'disrupted' by "passing" as the other. However, this disruption only occurs within a construction of knowledge for those who *believe* it, and does not necessarily alter gendered performances, which are deeply embedded and enduring in cultural and social legacy. Moreover, because the link between gender and biological sex was broken by social constructionism *prior* to Wilchins' (1997) adoption of postmodern theories, she does not act as an agent breaking free from constraints, but merely appropriates and fosters a recycled narrative that *preceded* her. Social constructionist and postmodern theories of sexual multiplicity, then, merely acted as objects of novelty for Wilchins (1997) as an *interested* individual.

Wilchins (1997) asserts that every time an individual performs a meaning (identity) they are recreating it. Thus, her attempts for acquiring agency are found in confusing others, having them

“read the map incorrectly” (1997: 154). However, unless the transgendered individual were to *announce* their transgender identity within all social interactions, one of two genders is still presumed by the other and therefore Wilchins does not succeed in her *political or social* goals. Her only success for gender performance disruption is for herself in *reflection* (“I” and “Me” and pasts), and for the approval of the transgender community (generalized others). Moreover, transgender and gender performances have different *meanings* to different individuals. While theorists agree that most automatically sex categorize in interaction, Wilchins (1997) can only *self-categorize* within the limitations outlined by the transgender community. Because she cannot alter how *others* outside and inside of her community perceive her, she cannot achieve agency within the constraints of gender structures.

Lastly, the notion that authenticity and gendered performances are innate is based upon everyday interactions, which both reifies and reinforces gendered divisions with differentiated scripts. It is at the meso layer, the point of self-reflection and vigilance of perceptions among others that Mead’s theory of the generalized other is most salient in examining transgender narratives. Further, while “doing gender” illuminates the fact that gender performance is socially constructed, this also shows that the performances the individual can choose from are constrained and limited by what is available. While transgendered individuals assume they are embarking on a level of agency by “disrupting” the link between biological sex and gender performance, they are in fact reproducing divisions by *copying* the gender performance of the opposite sex, while leaving intact gendered structures and constraints.

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